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Abstract
This paper investigate how the corporate (profit) tax rate affects the optimal degree of
privatization in a mixed duopoly, while introducing a minimum profit constraint for the private
firm. Firstly, we show that the profit tax rate directly affects the behavior of the partially
privatized firm and affects the behavior of the private firm through strategic interaction. In
addition, we investigate the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and corporate
tax policy, and find that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the corporate tax
rate, regardless of whether the constraint is binding. The optimal degree of privatization
decreases (increases) with the foreign ownership share in the private firm if the constraint is
ineffective (effective). This result suggests that a minimum profit constraint can be crucial in
the optimal privatization policy.
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1 Introduction
The world saw a wave of privatization of state-owned public enterprises for more than 50 years.
Nevertheless, many public enterprises with significant government ownership are still active in
strategic sectors and control large portions of the world’s resources. According to an OECD report
by Kowalski et al. (2013), more than 10% of the 2,000 largest companies are public enterprises
with sales equivalent to approximately 6% of worldwide GDP. They are significant players in
sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance in OECD countries. In
planned and transitional countries such as China, Vietnam, and Russia, the presence of the public
enterprises is more significant, and many state enterprises compete against private enterprises (Cai
and Li, 2011; Huang and Yang, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Fridman, 2018).
One classic rationale for public enterprises is to prevent private monopolies in natural monopoly
markets in which significant economies of scale prevail. However, due to technological improve-
ments, many markets with public enterprises do not always have significant economies of scale.
Indeed, a considerable number of public enterprises coexist with private enterprises in a wide range
of industries (mixed oligopolies).1 The optimal privatization policies in these mixed oligopolies at-
tracted extensive attention from researchers in such fields as public economics, financial economics,
industrial organization, and development economics.2
Specifically, the literature on mixed oligopolies investigates the optimal privatization policy in
different situations. Matsumura (1998) shows that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero
unless full nationalization yields a public monopoly. Chang (2005) demonstrates that the optimal
degree of privatization depends on whether the public firm is the Stackelberg leader or all firms
face Cournot competition. Chang (2007) examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization
policies in an international mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives, showing that the
1Examples of public and semi-public enterprises include the United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, and
Japan Post in the overnight delivery industry; NTT in the telecom industry; Areva, Electricite de France, and Petro
China Company in the energy industry; Volkswagen and Renault in the automotive industry; and Japan Postal
Bank, Kampo, Korea Development Bank, Korea Investment Corporation, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China in the financial industry.
2For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this field, see Pal and Saha (2014), Wang et al.
(2014), and the works cited therein.
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optimal degree of privatization depends crucially on the cost and demand parameters and on the
availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. Lin and Matsumura (2012) show that the
optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases) with the foreign ownership share in private
firms (partially privatized firms). Matsumura and Okamura (2015) find that the optimal degree of
privatization may increase when the market competition among private firms loosens. Chang and
Ryu (2015) investigate vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with
a foreign private rival and show that full nationalization can be optimal, while full privatization
cannot be, in contrast to Matsumura (1998).3 Han and Ogawa (2012) show that an increase in the
effectiveness of demand-boosting activities reduces the optimal degree of privatization. Fridman
(2018) investigates the optimal privatization policy in an exhaustible resource industry. Sato and
Matsumura (2018) find that the optimal degree of privatization can change dynamically.
In free entry markets, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) show that the optimal degree of privati-
zation is zero when private competitors are domestic, while Cato and Matsumura (2012) find that
it is strictly positive when private competitors are foreign and increases with the foreign ownership
share in private firms. In addition, Chen (2017) illustrates that the optimal degree of privatization
is positive, even in free entry markets, if privatization improves production efficiency. Fujiwara
(2007) shows a monotonic (non-monotonic) relationship between the degree of product differenti-
ation and the optimal degree of privatization in a free entry (non-free entry) market. However, no
study as of yet investigates the role of corporate (profit) tax in mixed oligopolies.
The literature on mixed oligopolies discusses the relationship between tax subsidy and pri-
vatization policies. Mujumdar and Pal (1998) show that a production tax affects the behavior
of public firms, which affects the behavior of private firms through strategic interaction. White
(1996) investigates the optimal subsidy policy and finds that the privatization policy is irrelevant
under the optimal subsidy policy (privatization neutrality theorem).4 Cato and Matsumura (2015)
3For another discussion of upstream mixed oligopolies, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2012). For a discussion
on downstream mixed oligopolies, see Wu et al. (2016).
4Cato and Matsumura (2013) show that the privatization neutrality theorem holds in free entry markets by
considering an optimal production subsidy and entry license tax. However, this theorem is not robust because
it does not hold unless the private firm has zero foreign ownership, both public and private firms have the same
cost function, and there is no excess burden of taxation. See Matsumura and Tomaru (2012, 2013) and Lin and
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discuss the relationship between the optimal import tariff and the optimal degree of privatization
and show that a higher tariff rate reduces (increases) the optimal degree of privatization in free
entry (non-free entry) markets.5 Again, however, none investigate corporate tax policy. Corporate
tax is one of main taxes in many developed, developing, and transitional economies.6 Moreover,
the corporate tax rate affects a firm’s choice of location; thus, both central and local governments
often use corporate tax policies strategically to attract firms, especially in developing and transi-
tional economies. As the literature on mixed oligopolies shows, privatizing public firms increases
private firms’ profits and thus attracts firms (Mukherjee and Suetrong, 2009). Hence, privatization
and corporate tax policies may play complementary roles.7
In this study, we introduce corporate tax policy and a minimum profit constraint for a private
firm into a mixed duopoly model and investigate the relationship between privatization and corpo-
rate tax policies.8 In a private oligopoly in which a public firm is fully private, the profit tax does
not affect the firms’ output levels. However, the profit tax rate directly affects the output level of a
partially privatized firm and thus affects that of the private firm through strategic interaction. We
then investigate how the tax rate affects the optimal degree of privatization. We find that whether
or not the constraint is binding, the optimal degree of privatization increases with the corporate
tax rate. Next, we investigate how the degree of privatization affects the optimal tax policy. We
find that the tax rate increases with the degree of privatization.
We also investigate the relationship between the foreign ownership share in the private firm
and the optimal privatization policy. Foreign ownership in private firms plays an important role
in mixed oligopolies because it affects the behavior of the public firm directly and affects that of
Matsumura (2018).
5Chang (2005, 2007) also provides important contributions in terms of the relationship between the optimal
degree of privatization and various other policies such as industrial and trade policies.
6It is the third largest source of federal revenue in the U.S. and of the central government in Japan, and the
largest tax revenue source for the Tokyo Metropolitan government in Japan.
7The corporate tax rate in China averaged 29 percent from 1997 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 33 percent
in 1998 and a record low of 25 percent in 2008 (Urban Institute & Brookings Institute, and Trading Economics).
For a discussion of privatization, capital income taxation, and foreign ownership of private firms, see Huizinga and
Nielsen (1997, 2001).
8We assume that if the minimum profit constraint is not satisfied, the private firm exits or does not enter the
market.
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private firms through the strategic interaction between public and private firms. How the effect
of the foreign ownership share on privatization changes with the corporate taxation policy and
minimum profit constraint is another issue worth discussion under a mixed oligopoly. We show
that without the minimum profit constraint, the optimal degree of privatization decreases with the
foreign ownership share in the private firm. However, the inverse is true when the minimum after-
tax profit constraint is effective. This result suggests that the minimum after-tax profit constraint
of the private firm may be crucial for the optimal privatization policy.9
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates the mixed duopoly model.
Section 3 investigates how the corporate tax rate affects the optimal privatization policy. Section
4 introduces the minimum profit constraint. Section 5 investigates how the degree of privatization
affects the optimal corporate tax. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a mixed duopoly model in which one state enterprise, firm 0, and one private enter-
prises, firm 1, compete.10 Firm 0 is owned by domestic (local) investors, including the govern-
ment.11 The foreign ownership share in firm 1 is β ∈ [0, 1]. Firms produce homogeneous products
for which the inverse demand function is p(Q), where p is the price and Q is the total output. We
assume that p is twice continuously differentiable and p′ < 0 as long as p > 0. The marginal costs
of firm i is ci (i = 0, 1). We assume that c0 > c1.
12
9See the literature starting with Corneo and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996), as well as Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n (2005a, 2005b), Han and Ogawa (2008), Lin and Matsumura (2012), Wang and Tomaru (2015), and Xu et
al. (2016).
10Our results hold in more general mixed oligopolies with n-private firms as long as all private enterprises are
identical.
11The assumption that the investors in privatized firms are domestic is standard in the literature (Cato and
Matsumura, 2012; Chang, 2005, 2007; Chang and Ryu, 2015; Lee et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2016, Xu et al., 2016,
2017), and may be realistic. On the other hand, foreign investors may also hold stakes in private. For example, the
foreign private ownership share in the Postal Bank is about one-fifth of the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group. For
discussions on foreign investors in privatized firms, see Lin and Matsumura (2012).
12If c0 ≤ c1, then the public monopoly appears in equilibrium and there is no room to discuss mixed oligopolies.
Assuming constant marginal costs with a cost disadvantage for a public firm is popular in the literature on mixed
oligopolies. See Pal (1998), Mujumdar and Pal (1998), and Matsumura and Ogawa (2010). For a discussion on
the endogenous cost disadvantage of public firms, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004). Many empirical studies
illustrate that public firms in developing countries and emerging markets produce less efficiently than do private
firms (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Megginson and Netter, 2001; La Porta et al., 2002).
5
Firm i’s profit is pii = (p−ci)qi, where qi is firm i’s output. The government imposes a corporate
(profit) tax τ ∈ [0, 1) and the after-tax profit of firm i is (1− τ)pii.13
Domestic (local) welfare W is given by
W =
∫ Q
0
p(z)dz − pQ+ (1− τ)pi0 + (1− β)(1− τ)pi1 + τ(pi0 + pi1).
Following Matsumura (1998), the public firm’s objective is a convex combination of social surplus
and their own profit, α(1 − τ)pi0 + (1 − α)W .14 α ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of privatization.
In the case of full nationalization (i.e., α = 0), firm 0 maximizes welfare. In the case of full
privatization (i.e., α = 1), firm 0 maximizes its (after-tax) profit. The private firm’s objective is
its after-tax profit.
The complete information game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses
the degree of privatization. In the second stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its output to
maximize its objective. We solve this game by backward induction and the equilibrium concept is
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We assume interior solutions in the last stage subgames
(i.e., we assume that both firms produce positive output in the quantity competition stage).
3 Equilibrium
First, we solve the second stage game given α. The first-order condition of the public firms is
α(1− τ)p′q0 − β(1− α)(1− τ)p′q1 + (1− ατ)(p− c0) = 0. (1)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied.15
13If pii is negative, then the firm reduces the tax burden of other profitable departments, and thus reduces the tax
payment. Therefore, we can see that firm i’s after-tax profit is (1− τ)pii, even when it is negative. If we assume that
the after-tax profit of firm i is pii rather than (1 − τ)pii, then all Lemmas and Propositions except for Lemma 1(i)
hold. In addition, we can drop the condition “if pi0 ≥ 0” in Lemma 4(ii), Proposition 3(i), and Proposition 5(ii). We
replace Lemma 1(i) with the statement “ If α < 1, qS0 , and Q
S are decreasing in τ , and qS1 is increasing in τ .”
14For empirical evidence on the welfare-related rather than profit-maximizing objectives of public enterprises, see
Ogura (2018). If we assume that firm 0’s payoff is αpi0 + (1 − α)W rather than α(1 − τ)pi0 + (1 − α)W , then our
Lemmas and Propositions except for Lemma 1(i) hold. In addition, we can drop the condition “if pi0 ≥ 0” in Lemma
4(ii), Proposition 3(i), and Proposition 5(ii). We replace Lemma 1(i) with the statement “ If α < 1, qS0 , and Q
S are
decreasing in τ , and qS1 is increasing in τ .”
15This holds if |p′′| is small relative to |p′|.
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The first order-condition for each private firm is
p+ p′q1 − c1 = 0. (2)
We assume that p′ + p′′qi < 0 (i = 0, 1), which ensures that the strategy of firm 1 is a strategic
substitute and that the second-order condition is satisfied.
These first-order conditions yield the equilibrium outputs in the second stage. Let qS0 (α),
qS1 (α), and Q
S(α) be the equilibrium firm 0’s output, firm 1’s output, and the total output in the
second-stage subgame (the superscript S denotes the equilibrium outcome of the second stage).
Totally differentiating (1) and (2), we obtain
∂qS0
∂α
= −(p
′′x1 + 2p′)X1
X2
< 0,
∂qS1
∂α
=
(p′′x1 + p′)X1
X2
> 0,
∂QS
∂α
= −X1p
′
X2
< 0, (3)
where
X1 = (1− τ)[q0 + β(1− τ)q1] > 0, (4)
X2 = (1− ατ)
{
α(1− τ)p′′Q+ [(1− ατ) + 2α(1− τ) + β(1− α)(1− τ)]p′} < 0. (5)
The three results from (3) are standard in the literature on mixed oligopolies and prior works show
it repeatedly in various contexts. (3) indicates that these standard results hold in our model.
We investigate how τ affects the equilibrium outputs in the second stage given α. Totally
differentiating (1) and (2), we obtain
∂q0
∂τ
= −(p
′′x1 + 2p′)X3
X2
,
∂q1
∂τ
=
(p′′q1 + p′)X3
X2
,
∂Q
∂τ
= −X3p
′
X2
, (6)
where
X3 = (1− α)[−αq0 + β(1− α)q1]. (7)
If α = 1, then X3 = 0. From (1), we find that if α < 1 and p > c0 (p < c0), then X3 < 0 (X3 > 0).
Therefore, from (4), (5), (6), and (7), we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) If α < 1, then qS0 and Q
S are increasing (decreasing) in τ and qS1 is decreasing
(increasing) in τ as long as pi0 > 0 (pi0 < 0). (ii) If α = 1, then q
S
0 , q
S
1 , and Q
S are independent
of τ .
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We explain the intuition behind Lemma 1. Let τ0 be the corporate tax rate for firm 0 and τ1
be that for firm 1. An increase in τ0 reduces the after-tax profit of firm 0 and does not affect W .
Thus, an increase in τ0 decreases (increases) the weight of pi0 in firm 0’s payoff if pi0 > 0 (pi0 < 0),
which increases (decreases) q0.
An increase in τ1 increases the weight of pi1 in W , and thus, the higher τ1 is, the larger is the
incentive to increase pi1 for firm 0. Because an increase in q0 reduces firm 1’s profit, the higher τ1
is, the larger is the incentive to decrease q0 for firm 0. Therefore, an increase in τ1 decreases q0.
If pi0 < 0, both effects decrease q0 as τ(= τ0 = τ1) increases, and thus, an increase in τ reduces
q0.
16 If pi0 > 0, the two effects have opposite directions. However, the effect of τ0 dominates the
effect of τ1, and thus, q0 is increasing in τ as long as pi0 > 0. Firm 0 produces more aggressively
when τ is larger (direct effect).
Although τ does not directly affect the payoff of firm 1, τ affects q0 and thus affects q1 through
strategic interaction. Because firm 1’s strategy is that of a strategic substitute, the change in q1
has the opposite sign as the change in q0. Because the direct effect dominates this strategic effect,
the change in Q has the same sign as the change in q0.
This mechanism does not work when α = 1 because firm 0 does not care about the outflow of
firm 1’s profit to foreign investors and consumer surplus; thus, qS0 , q
S
1 , and Q
S are independent of
τ .
We next investigate how β affects the equilibrium outputs in the second stage given α. Totally
differentiating (1) and (2), we obtain
∂q0
∂β
= −(p
′′x1 + 2p′)X4
X2
≥ 0, ∂q1
∂β
=
(p′′q1 + p′)X4
X2
≤ 0, ∂Q
∂β
= −X4p
′
X2
≥ 0, (8)
where
X4 = −(1− τ)(1− α)(1− ατ)q1 ≤ 0. (9)
The equality in (9) holds if and only if α = 1.
16If we assume that the after-tax profit of firm 0 is pi0 rather than (1− τ0)pi0, then when pi0 < 0, the effect of τ0
disappears and only the effect of τ1 remains. In this case, an increase in τ reduces q0, and we obtain qualitatively
the same results in this alternative setting. See also footnote 11.
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From (5), (8), and (9), we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 (i) If α < 1, then qS0 and Q
S are increasing in β and qS1 is decreasing in β. (ii) If
α = 1, then qS0 , q
S
1 , and Q
S are independent of β.
Again, from (1) we find that β directly affects the behavior of firm 0 unless α = 1. Although β
does not directly affect firm 1’s payoff, β affects q0 and thus affects q1 through strategic interaction.
Because firm 1’s strategy is that of a strategic substitute, the change in q1 has the opposite sign
as the change in q0. Because the direct effect dominates this strategic effect, the change in Q has
the same sign as the change in q0.
We now investigate the first stage. The first-order condition for the government is
dWS
dα
=
∂W
∂q0
dqS0
dα
+
∂W
∂q1
dqS1
dα
= − 1
1− ατ
X1p
′
X2
X5 = 0, (10)
where
X5 = [(1− ατ)q1 − αX1]p′′q1 + [(1− ατ)q1 − 2αX1]p′. (11)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. Let αE be the equilibrium degree of
privatization.
Because X1 > 0 and X2 < 0, (10) is satisfied if and only if X5 = 0. When α = 0, X5 =
q1(q1p
′′ + p′) < 0. Therefore, we obtain αE > 0. Prior works on mixed oligopolies also show this
result (full nationalization is not optimal) in various contexts.17
When α = 1, X5 = ((1 − τ)q1 − X1)q1p′′ + ((1 − τ)q1 − 2X1)p′. Then αE = 1 if and only if
((1− τ)q1 −X1)q1p′′ + ((1− τ)q1 − 2X1)p′ ≤ 0.
Suppose that αE < 1; then, we obtain αE from X5 = 0. Totally differentiating X5 = 0 at the
equilibrium point, we obtain
dαE
dτ
= −∂X5/∂τ
∂X5/∂α
=
[αq1 − αq0 − 2αβ(1− τ)q1]p′′q1 + [αq1 − 2αq0 − 4αβ(1− τ)q1]p′
∂X5/∂α
. (12)
From (12), we obtain the following result.
17Matsumura (1998).
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Proposition 1 The optimal degree of privatization αE increases with the corporate tax rate τ as
long as αE < 1.
Proof See the Appendix.
We can explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. On the one hand, an increase in the degree
of privatization makes the public firm less aggressive, which increases the outflow of the private
firm’s profit to foreign investors. This outcome deteriorates local welfare. On the other hand, an
increase in the degree of privatization increases the private firm’s output, which improves local
welfare. This tradeoff explains the optimal privatization policy. An increase in the corporate tax
weakens the former welfare-reducing effect, and thus increases the optimal degree of privatization.
This yields Proposition 1.
We now discuss how β affects the optimal degree of privatization. Totally differentiating X5 = 0
at the equilibrium point, we obtain
dαE
dβ
= −∂X5/∂β
∂X5/∂α
=
−α(1− τ)2q1(p′′q1 + 2p′)
∂X5/∂α
. (13)
From (13), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The optimal degree of privatization αE decreases with the foreign ownership share
β as long as αE < 1.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lin and Matsumura (2012) show this result with a linear demand assumption when τ = 0.
Proposition 2 states that this result also holds with nonlinear demand. The larger β is, the more
the outflow of the profit of firm 1 to foreign investors is. Therefore, the government chooses a
smaller α to restrict this outflow.
Finally, we present a result that is useful for the discussion in Section 5. Let WF (τ) denote
the equilibrium local welfare in this game.
Lemma 3 If β > 0, then WF (τ) is increasing in τ .
Proof See the Appendix.
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When β = 0, W is independent of τ because corporate tax is only a transfer from domestic
investors to the government. However, if β > 0, then W depends on β, even when q0 and q1 are
exogenous because a higher tax rate increases the transfer from foreign investors to the government,
and thus improves welfare. Lemma 3 states that this holds true if α is endogenous, and thus q0
and q1 are endogenous.
In the previous section, we assume that the private firm stays in the market, regardless of the
government policies. However, if the corporate tax rate is too high, the private firm may exit the
market or may not enter the market. In this section, we impose the minimum after-tax profit
constraint to the private firm, firm 1. Specifically, we assume that firm 1 enters the market if and
only if
(1− τ)pi1 ≥ F, (14)
where F is a positive constant.
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses α. In the second stage,
firm 1 chooses whether to enter the market. In the third stage, firms face Cournot competition
when firm 1 enters.
If F is sufficiently large, then the government chooses a public monopoly and α = 0. Otherwise,
the government chooses α under the constraint (14). To examine the property of mixed oligopolies,
we focus on the latter case and restrict our attention to the case where pi0 ≥ 0 in equilibrium.
The previous section provides the analysis of the third stage game. We now present a result
on the relationship between the private firm’s profit and the degree of privatization. Let piS1 (α)
denote the equilibrium profit of firm 1 in the second-stage game.
Lemma 4 (i) The private firm’s profit (piS1 ) increases with the degree of privatization (α). (ii)
Given α, the private firm’s after-tax profit ((1− τ)piS1 ) decreases with the corporate tax rate (τ) if
(but not only if) pi0 ≥ 0. (iii) Given α(< 1) and τ , the private firm’s profit (piS1 ) decreases with
the foreign ownership share in firm 1 (β).
Proof See the Appendix.
An increase of the degree of privatization makes the public firm (firm 0) less aggressive, which
11
is beneficial for the private firm (firm 1). Similarly, a decrease in the foreign ownership share in
the private firm makes the public firm (firm 0) less aggressive, which is beneficial for the private
firm (firm 1).
Lemma 4(i) states that (1 − τ)piS1 (α) is increasing in α. We define α† by (1 − τ)piS1 (α†) = F.
Let αC denote the equilibrium degree of privatization in this game (the superscript C indicates
constraint).
If α† < αE , then the constraint (14) is not binding. Therefore, αC = αE and Propositions 1
and 2 hold. If α† ≥ αE , then the constraint (14) is binding. From the concavity of the welfare
function, we obtain αC = α†. From Lemma 4(ii), an increase in τ reduces (1 − τ)piS1 (α) given α
and β. To compensate for this reduction in firm 1’s after-tax profit, the government must increase
α (Lemma 4(i)). From Lemma 4(iii), an increase in β reduces (1 − τ)piS1 (α) given α and τ . To
compensate for this reduction in firm 1’s after-tax profit, the government must increase α (Lemma
4(i)). This discussion leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Under the minimum after-tax profit constraint, the optimal degree of privatization
(αC), (i) increases with the corporate tax rate (τ) if (but not only if) pi0 ≥ 0; (ii) increases with
the foreign ownership share in private firm as long as the constraint is binding.
Proposition 3(i) states that Proposition 1 is robust. The optimal degree of privatization in-
creases with the corporate tax rate, whether or not the minimum after-tax profit constraint exists.
Proposition 3(ii) states that Proposition 2 may not be robust. When the minimum after-tax profit
constraint is (is not) effective, the optimal degree of privatization increases (decreases) with the
foreign ownership share of the private firm. Therefore, we obtain the opposite policy implication
with and without the constraint.
Propositions 2 and 3 indicate a possible non-monotone relationship between the foreign own-
ership share in the private firm and the optimal degree of privatization. When β is small, pi1 is
high; thus, the constraint (14) may not bind. An increase in β reduces α as long as the constraint
does not bind (Proposition 2). An increase in β reduces pi1, and the constraint (14) may bind
12
eventually. After that, a further increase in β increases α. Thus, a U-shaped relationship between
α and β may appear.
4 Endogenous Corporate Tax
It may be unrealistic to assume that the government can choose a specific τ in a specific industry
or market, whereas it is realistic to assume that the government chooses a specific degree of
privatization in a specific industry. However, the government may extract firms’ profits by imposing
specific industry taxes, requiring bribes, or through foreign currency control in a targeted industry.
The government may strategically reduce the corporate tax rate for specific firms or industries to
attract firms, as we discuss in the Introduction. Therefore, in this section, we first discuss the
outcome if we endogenize both τ and α.
We consider the following game in which the government chooses both the corporate tax and
privatization policies. In the first stage, the government chooses τ and α. In the second stage,
firm 1 enters the market if and only if (14) is satisfied. In the third stage, firms face Cournot
competition when firm 1 enters the market.
Consider the final stage. Suppose that firm 1 enters the market. In Section 3, we derived the
equilibrium output. From Lemma 3, we find that the constraint (14) is binding as long as β > 0.
Again, we focus on the case where the mixed duopoly is better than a public monopoly for local
welfare. The government chooses τ and α under the constraint (14).18
As we show in Section 3, αE > 0 even when the constraint (14) is not binding. An increase in
α relaxes the constraint, and thus the welfare improving effect of an increase in α is larger with
the constraint than without the constraint. Thus, we obtain αE > 0.
We now present our result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the government chooses both the degree of privatization and the
corporate tax rate in the first stage. Suppose that β > 0.19 (i) The optimal degree of privatization
18If the constraint is not binding, the government can increase W by a marginal increase in τ . Moreover, at the
equilibrium tax rate, (1− τ)pi1 must be decreasing in τ because otherwise, the government can improve welfare by
a marginal increase in τ .
19If β = 0, then the equilibrium pair of (τ, α) is indeterminate and any pair of (τ, α) that yields the optimal q0 is
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is increasing in β. (ii)The optimal corporate tax rate is decreasing in β if (but not only if) pi0 ≥ 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Because the minimum profit constraint is always binding when the corporate tax rate and
the degree of privatization are endogenous, the changes in an exogenous variable that reduces the
private firm’s profit enhances the privatization policy and the tax exemption policy to attract
private firms.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the privatization policy and corporate tax
policy. We also investigate the effect of the foreign ownership share in the private firm on these
policies and introduce a minimum after-tax profit constraint. We show that (1) whether or not
the minimum after-tax profit constraint is effective, the optimal degree of privatization increases
with the corporate tax rate; (2) the optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases) with the
foreign ownership share in the private firm when the constraint is non-binding (binding); (3) the
optimal corporate tax rate increases with the degree of privatization; and (4) the optimal corporate
tax rate decreases with the foreign ownership share in the private firm.
In this study, we consider a single market model. The corporate tax rate is usually common
across industries, while the privatization policy differs. Investigating this problem requires a multi-
market model. While there are several recent studies on multi-market mixed oligopoly models, 20
extending our analysis to a multi-product model remains for future research.
the equilibrium pair of policies.
20For an analysis of multi-market mixed oligopolies, see Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017), Dong et al. (2018), and
Haraguchi et al. (2018).
14
Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Let
− 1
1− ατ
X1p
′
X2
:= X6.
From (10), we obtain
WS
′′
(α) =
∂X6
∂α
X5 +X6
∂X5
∂α
.
Because WS
′′
(α) < 0 and X5 = 0 at the equilibrium point and X6 < 0,we obtain ∂X5/∂α > 0.
Therefore, the denominators in (12) and (13) are positive.
Because the numerator in (13) is negative, we obtain Proposition 2.
Finally, we show that the numerator in in (12) is positive as long as αE < 1. As we show after
(11), αE < 1 if and only if ((1− τ)q1 −X1)q1p′′ + ((1− τ)q1 −X1)p′ > 0. Substituting X1 into it,
we obtain
(q1 − q0 − β(1− τ)q1)p′′q1 + (q1 − 2q0 − 2β(1− τ)q1)p′ > 0. (15)
The numerator in (12) is
α[(q1 − q0 − 2β(1− τ)q1)p′′q1 + (q1 − 2q0 − 4β(1− τ)q1)p′]
= α[(q1 − q0 − β(1− τ)q1)(p′′q1 + p′)− β(1− τ)q1(p′′q1 + 2p′)] > 0,
where we use (15). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that τ increases marginally, from τa to τb. Suppose that α
E < 1 when τ = τa. Suppose that
pi0 > 0 when τ = τa. Given α, this change increases the resulting q0 (Lemma 1(i)). Suppose that
the government increases α to keep the resulting q0 unchanged. Note that q1 remains unchanged
if q0 remains unchanged because neither τ nor α affects q1 directly, and both affect q1 through the
change in q0.
Because qS(1, τ) is independent of τ and qS(α, τ) > qS(1, τ) for any α < 1 and τ ∈ [0, 1), the
government can choose such an α as long as αE < 1. Because Q, q0, and q1 remains unchanged,
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CS, pi0, and pi1 remains unchanged. Thus, W increases by β(τb− τa)pi1. The above α with τb is not
the optimal α. Nevertheless, W increases with the increase in τ , and much more if the government
chooses the optimal α.
Suppose that αE < 1 when τ = τa. Suppose that pi0 ≤ 0 when τ = τa. Given α, this change
decreases the resulting q0 (Lemma 1(ii)). Suppose that the government decreases α to keep the
resulting q0 unchanged. Because q
S(α, τ) is decreasing in α and αE > 0, qS(0, τa) > q
S(αE , τa).
Due to the continuity of qS(α, τ), there exists an α′ such that qS(α′, τb) = qS(αE , τa) if τb − τa is
sufficiently small. Because Q, q0, and q1 remains unchanged, CS, pi0, and pi1 remains unchanged.
Thus, W increases by β(τb − τa)pi1. α′ is not the optimal α. Nevertheless, W increases with the
increase in τ , and much more if the government chooses the optimal α.
Suppose that αE = 1 when τ = τa. Suppose that the government keeps α
E = 1 after the
change in τ , which does not affect Q, q0, and q1. Thus, W increases by β(τb− τa)pi1 by the change
in τ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
From (6), we find that an increase in α increases q1 and reduces Q. Both increase pi
S
1 . No other
effect on pi1 exists. Therefore, pi
S
1 is increasing in α. This implies Lemma 4(i).
We obtain
∂[(1− τ)pi1]
∂τ
= −pi1 + (1− τ)p′q1∂q0
∂τ
+ (1− τ)(p′q1 + p− c1)∂q1
∂τ
. (16)
The first term in (16) is negative, the second term in (16) is non-positive if pi0 ≥ 0 (Lemma 1) and
the third term in (16) is zero from (2). These imply Lemma 4(ii).
Lemma 2 states that an increase in β decreases q1 and increases Q. Both reduce pi
S
1 . No other
effect on pi1 exists. Therefore, pi
S
1 is decreasing in α. This implies Lemma 4(iii).
Proof of Proposition 5
Given that the constraint is binding when the government chooses the optimal α and τ simulta-
neously, we take total derivative of the constraint (i.e., (1− τ)pi1 = F , where pi1 = (p− c1)q1)
−(p− c1)q1dτ + (1− τ)p′q1dQ+ (1− τ)(p− c1)dq1 = 0,
16
−(p− c1)q1dτ + (1− τ)p′q1dq0 = 0,
−pi1dτ + (1− τ)p′q1
[
−X1(p
′′q1 + 2p′)
X2
]
dα+ (1− τ)p′q1
[
−X3(p
′′q1 + 2p′)
X2
]
dτ
+(1− τ)p′q1
[
−X4(p
′′q1 + 2p′)
X2
]
dβ = 0.
From these, we obtain
dαE
dβ
= −X4
X1
> 0, (17)
dτE
dβ
= − (1− τ)p
′q1X4(p′′q1 + 2p′)
X2pi1 + (1− τ)p′q1X3(p′′q1 + 2p′) . (18)
From (17), we obtain Proposition 5(i).
The numerator in (18) is negative. Thus, if the denominator in (18) is negative, Proposition
5(ii) holds. Because pi1 > 0 in equilibrium, the denominator in (18) is negative if (but not only if)
X3 ≤ 0. X3 ≤ 0 if and only if pi0 ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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